Government Transfers and Poverty Transition in Metro and Nonmetro Areas: A Survival Analysis by Ulimwengu, John M.
Government Transfers and Poverty Transition in Metro and Nonmetro Areas 





John M. Ulimwengu  
Selected Paper presented at the American Agricultural Economics Association 







Copyright 2005 by John M. Ulimwengu. All rights reserved. Readers may make 
verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, 
provided that this copyright notice appears on all copies. 
   1
 
Introduction 
Understanding the dynamics of poverty is the foundation for successful poverty 
alleviation strategy. In the literature, only dynamic approaches to poverty provide 
insights on movement of individuals or households around a poverty threshold; this 
contrasts with static approaches that ignore the effect of time on assets and individual 
decisions. Static analysis does not account for the depletion and accumulation of assets 
over time, which is crucial in understanding movements into and out of poverty. 
However, even within dynamic framework, efforts to capture poverty dynamics often 
focus on explaining changes in family income or the family income-to-needs ratio. This 
implicitly assumes that an increase in family income alone would move poor individuals 
above poverty line. 
The question crucial to our understanding of the concentration of poverty and of 
the degree of mobility in the lower portion of the income distribution is this: how long 
will an individual falling into poverty spend below the poverty line (Stevens, 1999)? 
Introducing the survival framework into the analysis of poverty dynamics, Blane and 
Ellwood (1986) conclude that most of those who ever become poor will spend only a 
short time below the poverty line. This suggests that most of the people helped by 
transfers to economically disadvantaged families use them only briefly. However, most 
of welfare resources is absorbed by a much smaller group of poor (persistently poor) who 
happen to have very long stays in poverty.  
Individuals in two-parent households experience more transient poverty, with 
education and race playing important roles in predicting stays in poverty (Stevens, 1999).   2
The average stay in poverty for persons in households headed by Black, less-educated 
males is longer than that of persons in households headed by whites with at least a high 
school education. Stevens’s results suggest also that the conventional view that most 
individuals falling into poverty experience short stays below the poverty line should be 
modified to account for the frequency and importance of multiple spells of poverty. 
McKernan and Ratcliffe (2000) conclude that poverty entries and exits have 
changed over the past two decades, with the mid 1990s seeing an increase in both entries 
into poverty and exits from poverty. Controlling for demographic and economic factors, 
they found the likelihood of entering or exiting poverty to be highest for persons living in 
households with employment changes, followed by persons living in households with a 
shift in headship. For McKernan and Ratcliffe, change in household composition, 
employment, and disability status are the most important explanatory factors, whereas 
changes in economic conditions (state unemployment rates, GDP) have only a slight 
influence on poverty transitions. 
The studies cited above fail to explicitly assess the role of government transfers 
on movements into and out of poverty and to formally accounting for differences 
between metro and nonmetro areas. Moreover, they often treat welfare as a homogeneous 
program whereas it is a mosaic of diverse programs whose impact might differ across 
households and locations. The devolution of more responsibility to states under the 1996 
legislation increases even further the diversity of these programs. 
In this paper movement in and out of poverty is estimated using a discrete 
duration model where the exit from poverty refers to a temporal sequence in which the 
passage of time is combined with events marking transitions between different poverty   3
states. I seek to evaluate the impact of different government transfers under the welfare 
program on the probability of exit from poverty in metro and nonmetro areas. Controlling 
for both individual and geographical attributes, the present study aims to evaluate the 
change in the likelihood of exiting from poverty due to change in welfare policy.  
Apart from the above introduction, there are six other sections. In the next section, 
I review the literature on welfare and poverty alleviation. The third section sketches out 
the empirical model to be used. Data and some relevant trends are presented in the fourth 
section. In the fifth section, I discuss estimation results. Concluding remarks are 
presented in the last section.    
 
Welfare impact on poverty: literature review. 
The research on the impact of welfare programs on poverty can be sorted into two 
categories (Fording and Berry, 2000). In one category are studies contending that welfare 
decreases poverty by raising the income of the poor above the poverty threshold. On the 
second categories are papers claiming that welfare’s impact has been to increase poverty 
by discouraging work. 
Schoeni and Blank (2000) found evidence that welfare policy changes reduced 
public assistance participation while increasing family earnings; as a result, poverty 
declined. They found that gains from the 1996 reforms were not as broadly distributed 
across the distribution of less-skilled women as were the effects of waivers. Moffitt and 
Rangarajan (1991) provide evidence suggesting that increases in Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) program tax rate might not be an effective tool for 
increasing labor supply and work incentives of female heads of households. Using a 
model for family labor supply, Hoynes (1996) found that work disincentive effects of Aid   4
to Families with Dependent Children-Unemployed Parent (AFDC-UP) range from 42 to 
50 hours per month for husbands and 29 to 33 hours per month for wives. However, if 
pushed out of AFDC-UP, most families would fail to increase earnings sufficiently to 
replace the resulting loss in income. In his review of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the effect of welfare on labor supply, Moffit (2002) concludes that many 
issues relating to the optimal levels of welfare programs and the social desirability of 
labor supply effects in different parts of the income distribution remain to be studied. 
Under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA), many recipients of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) are 
likely to reach time limits without finding stable jobs even in the presence of favorable 
economic conditions (Danziger, 2002). Focusing on rural areas, Lichter and Jensen 
(2002) found a reason for being optimistic about PRWORA. Their analysis shows that 
since the introduction of the 1996 welfare reform act, rural poverty rates have declined 
among female-headed families along with the rates of welfare receipts. Moreover, labor 
participation has increased as well as average earnings. Iceland (2003) points out that 
although the majority of welfare leavers are working, they usually have low-wage jobs so 
that their earnings remain low; as a result, many remain in poverty for a period of time 
after leaving welfare. According to Meyer and Sullivan (2001), tax and welfare changes 
have sharply increased the employment of single mothers and cut welfare rolls. Their 
study suggests that the material conditions of single mothers have improved slightly, 
even for highly disadvantaged single mothers.  
As a component of human capital, access to health care plays a significant role in 
the dynamics of poverty. Analyzing the impact of welfare on health, Kaestner and   5
Kaushal (2003) suggest that the decrease in the welfare caseload between 1996 and 1999 
was associated with significant changes in insurance coverage among low-educated, 
single mothers, a seven to nine percent decrease in Medicaid coverage, an increase in 
employer-sponsored, private insurance coverage of six percent; and a two to nine percent 
increase in the proportion of persons who are uninsured. Bitler, Gelbach and Hoynes 
(2004) found that welfare reform is associated with reductions in health insurance 
coverage and health care utilization. In addition, welfare reform increased the likelihood 
of needing health care.  
Most of these studies focus on program caseloads, labor market participation and 
increase in participants’ earnings. However, if the final goal of the welfare program is to 
“pull” disadvantaged families out of poverty, then one should not focused only on the 
decline in the welfare caseload, the increase in labor participation among recipients, or 
increases in earnings. These are the necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for decline in 
poverty. Instead, welfare program should be evaluated on whether it induces exit from 
poverty.  
 
Modeling exit from poverty 
Early research on the study of poverty dynamics used longitudinal data to observe 
and count the number of years individuals spend in poverty over a fixed sample period. 
These early attempts failed to account for the fact that people who end (or begin) a period 
in poverty may be ending (or starting) a long stay in poverty, despite the fact that they 
appear to be poor in only one or two of the observed years (Stevens, 1999). By implicitly 
ignoring the censoring of spells, these methods consistently understate persistent poverty. 
Lillard and Willis (1978) used a components-of-variance model with panel data on male   6
earnings to estimate permanent and serially correlated transitory components. Ulimwengu 
and Kraybill (2004) applied the components-of-variance methods to the family income-
to-needs ratio in the United States while adjusting for cost of living and controlling for 
number of years individuals or households spent in poverty, household demographics and 
area characteristics. Although it is possible to examine the frequency and duration of 
periods of poverty after estimating such models, most of the studies using the 
components-of-variance method do not provide the estimation of distribution of time 
spent below the poverty line.  
As in Ulimwengu and Kraybill (2004), I assume each household maximizes utility 
subject to various constraints ranging from individual characteristics to regional and 
community attributes, including governmental policy. Household i is endowed with a 
vector of assets, Ait, at time t.  Each period, household i chooses a level of consumption 
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where U(·) is a utility function and δ is the discount rate. Using Bellman’s equation, the 
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where f(·) is a generalized earnings function, Pt is a vector of market prices at which 
entitlements are sold and purchased, and Θ is a vector of stochastic asset shocks that can 
be positive or negative. Earnings depend upon individual characteristics and also upon 
community assets.  
Optimal consumption (
*
i C ), the solution to the preceding dynamic optimization 
problem, is assumed to be determined by variables drawn from both individualist and 
structuralist theories of poverty. If  i C is the level of consumption that guarantees a 
minimum living standards, then household i is considered poor if and only if  i i C C <
* . To 
capture the dynamics of 
*
i C around i C , the empirical model describes the rates of exit 
from poverty. 
At the aggregate level, the number of households entering ( t E ) poverty in period 
tis defined as the number of households that were not in poverty in period  1 − t  but 
become poor in periodt. Similarly, the number of households leaving ( t L ) poverty in 
period tis defined as the number of households in poverty in period  1 − t  but out of 
poverty in periodt. Let 1 , − t p N and  1 , − t n N denote, respectively, the number of households in 
poverty and the number of households not in poverty in period 1 − t . Thus the 
probabilities of entering and exiting poverty in period tare given by 
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I model the length of time before first exit from poverty.  Formally, the survivor 
function is defined as    8
) ( 1 ) Pr( ) ( t F t T t S − = > =           ( 6 )  
where t is the time spent in poverty, T is the event time (number of years prior first exit 
from poverty) for particular individual (household  representative), and F(t) is the 
associated cumulative distribution function. 
Assuming a Weibull distribution for T, conditional on the covariates it x , the 
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where σ is a parameter of the Weibull distribution that determines the shape of the hazard 
function:  1 > σ  denotes increasing hazards over time,  1 < σ  denotes decreasing hazards, 
and  1 = σ indicates the Weibull distribution collapses to a logistic distribution exhibiting 
a constant hazard rate over time; ε  is a random variable with type-1 extreme value 
distribution. In log-linear form with a Weibull distribution, the model can be written as 
σε β β β + + + + = nt n t x x T ... log 1 1 0                                                      (8) 
In the literature, equation (8) is referred to as an accelerated failure time (AFT) model. 
Explanatory variables ( it x ) include demographic characteristics of individuals (gender, 
race/ethnicity, age, marital status); education level and employment status of individuals; 
household welfare participation; household structure (household size); and geographical 
variables (place of residence, local welfare benefits). 
For simplicity, most studies on poverty dynamics using survival analysis assume a 
logistic distribution, which is inconsistent with the time-dependency of poverty 
dynamics. The longer the poverty spell, the lower the probability of exit; inversely, the 
shorter the stay in poverty, the higher the probability of exit. This means that poverty   9
dynamics produce monotonic (increasing or decreasing) hazards as does Weibull 
distribution. In contrast, the logistic distribution implies that the probability of poverty 
exit is invariant to the length of the poverty spell. As pointed out by Collett (1994), if the 
characterization of time-dependency is accurate, parameter estimates will be more precise 
than estimates from models where the time dependency is unspecified. Larsen and 
Vaupel (1993) put it differently, “in the analysis of duration data . . . if the functional 
form of the hazard has the wrong shape, even the best-fitting model may not fit the data 
well enough to be useful.” 
Right censored observations are accounted for in this study. However, I do not 
address the issue of unobserved heterogeneity (Allison, 1995). Indeed, Heckman and 
Singer (1985) point out that accounting for unobserved heterogeneity tends to produce 
estimated hazard functions that decline with time, even if the true hazard is not declining 
for any individual in the sample.  
 
Data 
The principal source of data for is a geocoded version of the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79).  The dataset is a nationally representative 
sample of 12,686 individuals who were ages 14-21 in 1978.  This cohort was interviewed 
annually from 1979 to 1994 and biennially since 1994. Additional community level data 
were obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce. Figure 1 displays a time-trend of 
the probability of exiting from (Pexit) and entering into (Pentry) poverty along with 
indexes of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In this study, the official poverty 
threshold is adjusted to account for geographical differences in housing costs (Citro and 
Michael, 1995).   10
The probability of exiting poverty increased until 1986 before stabilizing around 
60% during the 1990s. This means that six out of 10 persons entering poverty in a given 
year manage to exit from poverty the next year. In contrast, the probability of entering 
poverty declined from 62% in 1980 to 17% in 2000. This favorable trend in poverty 
reduction may be the result of a favorable macroeconomic environment as depicted by 
indexes of real GDP. This suggests that, ceteris paribus, improved macroeconomic 
conditions may turn out to be the best welfare instrument. 
As shown in figures 2 and 3, metro areas have an advantage in both probability of 
exiting from and probability of entering into poverty. Indeed, over the entire period under 
review, the probability of exiting from poverty has been higher in metro than in nonmetro 
areas; inversely, the probability of entering into poverty has been lower in metro areas 
compared to nonmetro areas. Data in table 1 suggest that both poverty and non poverty 
spells are frequent; 54.6% individuals in metro and 50.4% in nonmetro enter poverty 
after experiencing three years or less out of poverty. The exit rate is even faster, 98.0% 
and 97.4% individuals in metro and nonmetro respectively exit poverty after only one or 
two years in poverty. This result confirms that the probability of exiting from or entering 
into poverty is inversely proportional to the duration of the spell; the more time one 
spends in poverty, the lower is his probability of exiting from poverty. Likewise, the 
longer the stay out of poverty, the lower the probability of entering poverty.   
In this paper, the following government transfers are considered: unemployment 
insurance compensation, retirement and disability insurance benefits, income 
maintenance benefits, and medical benefits. At the county level, these government   11
transfers all exhibit a growing trend in nominal terms throughout the 1979-1996 period 
(table 2) and start declining thereafter. This is probably a combined result of PRWORA 
and favorable macroeconomic conditions that led to a decrease in welfare caseload during 
this period. Except for the retirement benefits, residents in metro areas tend to receive 
more government transfers than those in nonmetro areas.  
Estimation results 
The model estimated is a log-linear version of the Weibull model which links the 
number of years prior first exit from poverty to individual and spatial characteristics 
drawn from both individualist and structuralist approaches to poverty. The coefficients of 
the model associated with continuous variables have a semi-elasticity interpretation; they 
represent the percentage change in survival time before exiting from poverty induced by 
a unit change in the independent variable. Two versions of the model are presented in 
table 3; one with aggregate county-level government transfers, the other with individuals 
or disaggregate transfers. For per capita government transfers, the unit change represents 
an additional thousand dollars.  
Demographics 
Results in table 3 suggest that persons aged 40 years or older spend more time in 
poverty spells before exiting for the first time than younger persons and spend almost 
45% more time in poverty than younger individuals
1. This might be because persons of 
40 years or more are more exposed to events such as divorce, lay-off and fertility that 
may explain their longer stay in poverty. Additional members in the household increase 
the length of time prior to exit a poverty spell for the first time.  
                                                 
1 In this sample, the oldest is 44.   12
Compared to Non-Hispanic Whites, Black people spend 13.2% more time in 
poverty prior to exit. Hispanics experience shorter (4.6%) stay in poverty than Non-
Hispanic Whites. A similar pattern is observed for Asians when compared to Non-
Hispanic Whites. Poverty spells tend to be shorter by 27.6% for males than for females, 
suggesting the existence of gender discrimination.  
This study confirms the already established social advantage of married persons 
over non-married ones. Compared to the non-married, married individuals exit poverty 
faster on average than never married, separated and divorced individuals by 8.9%, 18.1% 
and 8.7%, respectively. Encouraging marriage might be effective in fostering exit from 
poverty. 
Education and labor market 
 Although unexpectedly small, the role of education on poverty transition is 
significant. Individuals with a college or university degree experience 5.0% shorter stays 
in poverty than those with a high school degree. Participation in the labor market 
increases the probability of exiting from poverty. Employed individuals spend 4.5% less 
time in poverty prior to exit than unemployed individuals. Transition in and out of 
poverty is not homogeneous across sectors of employment. Compared to those in Public 
Administration, only individuals in Manufacturing experience shorter (1.6%) stays in 
poverty. Construction and Wholesale employees spend 8.0% and 8.8% more time in 
poverty than those in Public Administration.  
Welfare participation 
Welfare participants are compared to individuals who never been poor (non-
poor), those in poverty for nine years or less (transitorily poor), and those poor for ten   13
years or more (persistently poor) during the 1979-2000 period. I assume that to be 
effective, welfare programs should make their participants at least as better off as the 
persistently poor who do not participate. The results suggest that individuals involved in 
job training programs experience the same amount of time in poverty before exiting as 
the persistently poor who did not receive the training.  
Compared to non participants, AFDC/Temporally Aid to Needy Families (TANF) 
or Food Stamp program participants exhibited a significant advantage only before 1996 
reform when they spent on average 24.5% less time in poverty before exiting. Those 
receiving housing subsidies tend to stay longer in poverty. This might be an indication of 
an adverse selection effect where constraints on welfare participation (time limit, work 
requirement and welfare stigma) attract only individuals with low skills. As a result, they 
use welfare as a coping strategy rather than an exit strategy.  
Spatial attributes and government transfers 
Evidence of spatial heterogeneity is found. Compared to individuals living in the 
South, those in North Central and West spend on average 8.5% less time in poverty 
before exiting. As for metro and nonmetro differences, nonmetro residents stay in poverty 
15.7% longer than metro residents.  At the aggregate level, the results suggest that while 
government transfers were successful in reducing time in poverty in both metro and 
nonmetro areas before 1996 reform, they unexpectedly tend to increase spells of poverty 
after reform. However, as shown below, such aggregation may hide possible 
heterogeneity in government transfers.   
Considered separately, in metro areas a unit increase in income maintenance 
benefits reduces time in poverty by 17.0% before reform but has no significant impact   14
after reform. A similar unit change increases time in poverty in nonmetro areas by 12.6% 
before and 26.0% after reform. It appears that the 1996 reform has not reduced given the 
impact on the duration of poverty spells in both metro and nonmetro areas.  
Before as well as after the reform, unemployment insurance compensation has 
significantly reduced poverty spells both in metro and nonmetro areas but more so in 
nonmetro than metro areas. One unit change in unemployment insurance compensation in 
nonmetro areas has reduced the length of time in poverty by 28.2% before and 90.6% 
after reform. In metro areas, time in poverty was reduced by only 2.9% before and 19.9% 
after reform. 
Medical benefits are a success story of the reform. Through medical transfers, 
poverty spells have been reduced by 5.2% and 9.4% respectively in metro and nonmetro 
areas after the reform. Retirement and disability insurance benefits have mixed results. 
They decreased time in poverty by 6.1% in metro areas and 25.1% nonmetro areas before 
reform while increasing it by 19.2% in metro areas and 14.4% in nonmetro after reform.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The aim of this study was to evaluate the impact of government transfers to 
socially disadvantaged families on their transitions in and out of poverty. Controlling for 
both individual and geographical characteristics, the results suggest that government 
transfer programs yield different results depending on the location where the transfers are 
made. With respect to the 1996 reform, the study shows that outcomes differ from one 
program to another. Here, too, the distribution of impact varies across geographical 
locations, especially between metro and nonmetro areas.   15
In terms of fostering exit from poverty, some significant and positive results of 
government transfers were found at county level.  Income maintenance benefits may be 
more effective in metro areas, while unemployment insurance compensation and medical 
benefits yield desirable outcomes in both metro and nonmetro areas. As for retirement 
and disability insurance benefits, they are effective neither in metro areas nor in 
nonmetro areas. The question that remains is how to advise policymakers to design a 
strategy that targets specific areas while sorting out the desired effects of each 
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Table 1: Poverty Dynamics in Metro and Nonmetro Areas. 
Years before 
entering into or 
exiting from 
poverty 
Percentage of those 
entering poverty for the 
first time after n years 
out of poverty 
Percentage of those 
exiting poverty for 
the first time after n 
years in poverty 
n  Metro Nonmetro  Metro  Nonmetro 
1 30.5  28.1  16.9  17.6 
2 2.6  1.8  81.1  79.8 
3 21.5  20.5  0.3  0.6 
4 8.7  11.9  0.2  0.1 
5 6.7  6.2  0.3  0.3 
6 4.6  4.9  0.3  0.4 
7 2.9  5.0  0.2  0.1 
8 3.0  1.7  0.2  0.3 
9 3.4  2.5  0.1  0.2 
10 2.3  1.5  0.1  0.1 
11 2.6  0.5  0.0  0.0 
12 1.1  0.7  0.1  0.0 
13 0.9  4.4  0.1  0.1 
14 1.8  2.4  0.0  0.0 
15 1.1  1.0  0.0  0.0 
16 1.6  2.5  0.1  0.1 
17 2.5  1.8  0.0  0.1 
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Table 2: Per capita Government Transfers ($). 
  Income maintenance benefits  Medical benefits  Retirement and disability insurance benefits  Unemployment insurance compensation 
Years Metro  Nonmetro  Difference Metro  Nonmetro  Difference Metro  Nonmetro  Difference  Metro  Nonmetro  Difference 
1979   $ 180.43    $  164.08    $ 16.35    $    416.78    $    370.88    $   45.90    $    656.21    $    729.82    $   (73.60)   $   62.29    $    59.06    $   3.22  
1980   $ 195.03    $  181.05    $ 13.99    $    425.25    $    391.40    $   33.85    $    680.71    $    775.95    $   (95.24)   $   83.01    $    75.78    $   7.24  
1981   $ 202.81    $  190.32    $ 12.48    $    451.74    $    422.30    $   29.44    $    725.03    $    833.03    $ (108.00)   $   80.11    $    74.73    $   5.38  
1982   $ 203.75    $  190.38    $ 13.36    $    474.98    $    439.94    $   35.04    $    758.17    $    867.13    $ (108.95)   $   98.43    $  103.55    $  (5.11) 
1983   $ 210.51    $  200.41    $ 10.10    $    502.54    $    468.86    $   33.69    $    781.71    $    898.90    $ (117.19)   $   99.51    $  103.45    $  (3.93) 
1984   $ 215.10    $  208.02    $   7.08    $    531.27    $    499.81    $   31.46    $    802.34    $    923.66    $ (121.32)   $   76.09    $    74.11    $   1.98  
1985   $ 221.93    $  217.86    $   4.07    $    562.07    $    533.96    $   28.11    $    834.25    $    955.96    $ (121.71)   $   74.33    $    72.04    $   2.29  
1986   $ 228.25    $  224.93    $   3.33    $    587.19    $    567.14    $   20.06    $    859.90    $    988.36    $ (128.46)   $   74.77    $    73.12    $   1.65  
1987   $ 230.33    $  221.68    $   8.65    $    605.86    $    574.55    $   31.31    $    873.32    $ 1,017.20    $ (143.88)   $   70.55    $    70.47    $   0.08  
1988   $ 242.43    $  233.06    $   9.37    $    638.79    $    615.47    $   23.32    $    908.60    $ 1,048.62    $ (140.03)   $   68.70    $    66.57    $   2.13  
1989   $ 255.98    $  244.22    $ 11.76    $    694.87    $    659.85    $   35.02    $    943.19    $ 1,088.96    $ (145.77)   $   71.51    $    69.10    $   2.41  
1990   $ 274.12    $  257.91    $ 16.21    $    752.91    $    718.77    $   34.14    $    981.50    $ 1,124.96    $ (143.46)   $   80.66    $    78.74    $   1.92  
1991   $ 302.97    $  284.14    $ 18.83    $    845.29    $    809.72    $   35.58    $ 1,028.06    $ 1,180.13    $ (152.07)   $ 100.08    $    94.91    $   5.17  
1992   $ 331.53    $  305.56    $ 25.96    $    931.53    $    870.55    $   60.98    $ 1,063.42    $ 1,212.58    $ (149.16)   $ 128.24    $  108.63    $ 19.61  
1993   $ 346.34    $  308.47    $ 37.87    $    998.03    $    920.62    $   77.41    $ 1,097.24    $ 1,238.78    $ (141.54)   $ 118.51    $  100.12    $ 18.39  
1994   $ 360.49    $  316.55    $ 43.94    $ 1,058.93    $    973.12    $   85.81    $ 1,119.11    $ 1,270.30    $ (151.19)   $   93.95    $    82.36    $ 11.59  
1996   $ 371.57    $  327.54    $ 44.03    $ 1,159.92    $ 1,036.84    $ 123.07    $ 1,165.43    $ 1,291.82    $ (126.40)   $   86.73    $    84.07    $   2.66  
1998   $ 360.22    $  319.97    $ 40.25    $ 1,178.02    $ 1,046.32    $ 131.71    $ 1,196.03    $ 1,323.31    $ (127.29)   $   79.21    $    78.96    $   0.25  
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Table 3: Estimation Results (Dependent variable is the number of years prior first exit from poverty). 
  with disaggregate transfers  with aggregate transfers 
Independent variables  Coefficients  Standard  error  Coefficients  
Standard 
error 
Intercept 1.252  *** 0.030  1.262  *** 0.029 
Individual/household characteristics            
Age            
    Over 40 years (default)             
   17 years or less (1 if in this age interval, 0  
    otherwise)  -0.447  *** 0.027  -0.458  *** 0.027 
    Between 17 and 40 years (1 if in this age interval, 
    0 otherwise)   -0.433  *** 0.026  -0.441  *** 0.026 
Size            
    4 or less  0.021  *** 0.002  0.021  *** 0.002 
    4 - 10   0.025  *** 0.001  0.024  *** 0.001 
    Over 10  0.029  *** 0.002  0.029  *** 0.002 
Race            
   Non-Hispanic White (default)             
   Black  0.132  *** 0.011  0.145  *** 0.011 
   Hispanic  -0.046  *** 0.012  -0.051  *** 0.012 
   Asian  -0.202  *** 0.062  -0.201  *** 0.062 
   Indian  0.081  *** 0.014  0.074  *** 0.014 
   Other  0.022  **  0.011  0.012    0.011 
Gender            
   Female (default)             
   Male  -0.276  *** 0.005  -0.275  *** 0.005 
Marital status             
   Married (default)             
   Never married (1=yes, 0=no)  0.089  *** 0.005  0.085  *** 0.005   24
   Separated (1=yes, 0=no)  0.181  *** 0.011  0.182  *** 0.011 
   Divorced (1=yes, 0=no)  0.087  *** 0.009  0.088  *** 0.009 
   Other  0.176  *** 0.032  0.185  *** 0.032 
Education            
   High school (default)             
   College/University  -0.050  *** 0.008  -0.046  *** 0.008 
   Other  0.110  *** 0.007  0.116  *** 0.007 
Labor market participation             
   Employed (1=yes, 0=no)  -0.045  *** 0.005  -0.036  *** 0.005 
   Sector of employment             
     Public Administration (default)             
     Agriculture   -0.001    0.023  0.003    0.023 
     Manufacturing   -0.016  *  0.009  -0.012    0.009 
     Construction  0.080  *  0.046  0.075    0.046 
     Wholesale  0.088  *** 0.011  0.086  *** 0.011 
     Other  0.081  *** 0.005  0.081  *** 0.005 
Welfare participation             
   Job training              
        Received training (default)             
        Did not receive, never poor  0.362  *** 0.011  0.362  *** 0.011 
        Did not receive, poor for 9 years or less  0.261  *** 0.018  0.258  *** 0.018 
        Did not receive, poor for 10 years or more  -0.068    0.111  -0.049    0.111 
   AFDC/TANF or Food Stamp            
        Before 1996 act             
           Participated (default)             
           Did not participate, never poor  0.467  *** 0.009  0.473  *** 0.009 
           Did not participate, poor for 9 years or less  0.261  *** 0.012  0.256  *** 0.012 
           Did not participate, poor for 10 years or more  -0.245  *** 0.083  -0.270  *** 0.084 
        After 1996 act             
           Participated (default)               25
           Did not participate, never poor  0.191  *** 0.015  0.191  *** 0.015 
           Did not participate, poor for 9 years or less  0.027    0.029  0.041    0.029 
           Did not participate, poor for 10 years or more  0.571  **  0.256  0.598  **  0.256 
       Subsidy              
           Received (default)             
           Did not receive, never poor  0.104  *** 0.010  0.103  *** 0.010 
           Did not receive, poor for 9 years or less  0.069  *** 0.015  0.068  *** 0.015 
           Did not receive, poor for 10 years or more  0.010    0.112  0.008    0.112 
Spatial attributes             
Region of residence             
   South (default)             
   Northeast  0.011    0.007  -0.004    0.006 
   North Central  -0.085  *** 0.006  -0.096  *** 0.006 
   West  -0.085  *** 0.007  -0.102  *** 0.006 
Metro/Nonmetro            
   Metro             
   Nonmetro  0.157  *** 0.015  0.098  *** 0.012 
Government per capita transfers             
   Total transfers ($ 1,000)             
       Metro             
           Before 1996 act  -    -  -0.040  *** 0.003 
           After 1996 act  -    -  0.045  *** 0.003 
       Nonmetro             
           Before 1996 act  -    -  -0.078  *** 0.005 
           After 1996 act  -    -  0.050  *** 0.005 
   Income maintenance ($ 1,000)             
       Metro             
           Before 1996 act  -0.170  *** 0.028  -    - 
           After 1996 act  -0.018    0.039  -    - 
       Nonmetro             
           Before 1996 act  0.126  *** 0.041  -    -   26
           After 1996 act  0.260  *** 0.069  -    - 
   Unemployment insurance ($ 1,000)             
       Metro             
           Before 1996 act  -0.029    0.049  -    - 
           After 1996 act  -0.199  **  0.094  -    - 
       Nonmetro             
           Before 1996 act  -0.282  *** 0.088  -    - 
           After 1996 act  -0.906  *** 0.196  -    - 
   Medical benefit ($ 1,000)             
       Metro             
           Before 1996 act  0.024  *  0.012  -    - 
           After 1996 act  -0.052  *** 0.015  -    - 
       Nonmetro             
           Before 1996 act  0.050  **  0.021  -    - 
           After 1996 act  -0.094  *** 0.034  -    - 
Retirement and disability ($ 1,000)             
       Metro             
           Before 1996 act  -0.061  *** 0.011  -    - 
           After 1996 act  0.192  *** 0.012  -    - 
       Nonmetro             
           Before 1996 act  -0.251  *** 0.017  -    - 
           After 1996 act  0.144  *** 0.026  -    - 
Distribution parameters             
    Scale  0.510    0.001  0.512    0.001 
    Weibull shape  1.959    0.005  1.954    0.005 
Log likelihood  -53,876  -54,112 
Number of observations  72,956  72,956 
*,**,*** significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels             
 
 